http://publicationslist.org/data/jose.alcalde/atom.xml Jose Alcaldehttp://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde$basepathfavicon.icoRecent additions to Jose Alcalde's PublicationsList.org pagehttp://publicationslist.org/publications.png2011-02-25T19:13:11Z http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid22 2011-02-25T19:12:20Z

This paper proposes the notion of ε-stability to conciliate Pareto efficiency and fairness. We propose the employ of a centralized procedure, the Exchanging Places Mechanism. It endows students according with the Gale and Shapley students optimal stable matching as tentative allocation and allows the student to trade their positions. We show that the final allocation is ε-stable, i.e. efficient,...<br/><br/>J. Alcalde, A. Romero-Medina (2011) <i>SSRN Working Paper 1743082</i><br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid26 2011-02-25T19:12:20Z

This paper proposes a reform for school allocation procedures in order to help integration policies reach their objective. For this purpose, we suggest the use of a natural two-step mechanism. The (stable) first step is introduced as an adaptation of the deferred-acceptance algorithm designed by Gale and Shapley (1962), when students are divided into two groups. The (efficient) second step capture...<br/><br/>J. Alcalde, B. Subiza (2011) <i>SSRN Working Paper 1768813</i><br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid24 2011-02-25T19:12:20Z

As it is known, there is no rule satisfying Additivity in the complete domain of bankruptcy problems. This paper proposes a notion of partial Additivity in this context, to be called µ-additivity. We find that µ-additivity, together with two quite compelling axioms, anonymity and continuity, identify the Minimal Overlap rule, introduced by Neill (1982). <br/><br/>J. Alcalde, M.C. Marco, J.A. Silva (2011) <i>SSRN Working Paper 1745528</i><br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid25 2011-02-25T19:12:20Z

This paper proposes a way to allocate students to schools such that conciliates Pareto efficiency and stability. Taking as a starting point the recent reform proposed by the Boston School Committee, we propose a marginal modification to reach our objective redefine how students are prioritize. Our proposal is to allow schools to prioritize only a small set of students an then use a common priority...<br/><br/>J. Alcalde, A. Romero-Medina (2011) <i>SSRN Working Paper 1760592</i><br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid20 2010-01-20T22:13:03Z

We consider rent seeking contests among at least two agents who might value the prize differently. We capture a wide range of institutional aspects of contests by analyzing a class of contest success functions fulfilling several properties. The main properties are anonymity and a condition on the elasticity of a rent seeker's win probability with respect to her effort. We show the existence of a m...<br/><br/>J. Alcalde, M. Dahm (2010) <i>Journal of Public Economics</i> 94: 1-2 1-7<br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid23 2011-02-25T19:12:20Z

Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an elementary equilibrium analysis of the complete information first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism when the bidding space has a finite grid. This paper aims to remedy that omission. We show that there always exists a "high price equilibrium'' which can be considered "the intuitive solution'' (an agent...<br/><br/>J. Alcalde, M. Dahm (2010) <i>SSRN Working Paper 1571243</i><br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid21 2010-11-15T09:15:09Z

J. Alcalde, M.c. Marco, J.A. Silva (2010) <i> Contributions to Game Theory and Management, Vol. III</i> 8-21<br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid16 2010-11-15T09:06:09Z

This work proposes a novel way to finance the public services in order to reach three objectives: (1) a (full) public access to the service; (2) a diversity of the service to be supplied; and (3) to provide the service at the lowest cost. The analyzed system, inspired in a proposal by Ibn Ezra, is studied by a (non-cooperative) game theoretical point of view.<br/><br/>J. Alcalde (2008) <i>La Construcción de la Paz. Propuestas Multidisciplinares</i> 33-43<br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid1 2009-07-19T13:28:50Z

This paper provides an analysis of the Minimal Overlap Rule, a solution for bankruptcy problems introduced by O'Neill (1982). We point out that this rule can be understood as a composition of the proposal made by Ibn Ezra and the recommendation given by the Constrained Equal Loss Rule. By following an interpretation of bankruptcy problems in terms of TU games, we show that the Minimal Overlap ...<br/><br/>J. Alcalde, M.C. Marco, J.A. Silva (2008) <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i> 31: 1 109-128<br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid2 2009-07-19T13:23:16Z

We introduce the serial contest by building on the desirable properties of two prominent contest games. This family of contest games relies both on relative efforts (as Tullock’s proposal) and on absolute effort differences (as difference-form contests). An additional desirable feature is that the serial contest is homogeneous of degree zero in contestants’ efforts. The family is characterized...<br/><br/>J. Alcalde and M. Dahm (2007) <i>Review of Economic Design</i> 11: 2 101-124<br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid3 2009-07-19T13:27:28Z

This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player’s payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We identify four natural conditions on individuals’ preferences and show that, under each condition, stable (core) allocations exists.<br/><br/>J. Alcalde, A. Romero-Medina (2006) <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i> 27: 2 365-375<br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid5 2009-07-19T13:38:42Z

This paper explores an old solution for bankruptcy problems, described by Ibn Ezra in the XII century. Particularly, we introduce a new way of extending the Ibn Ezra's proposal, the Generalized Ibn Ezra solution, by imposing that the general distribution principle from which it is inspired remains fixed. In this context, we follow the interpretation of bankruptcy problems in terms of TU games give...<br/><br/>J. Alcalde, M.C. Marco, J.A. Silva (2005) <i>Economic Theory</i> 26: 1 103-114<br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid4 2009-07-19T13:35:12Z

This paper models a contractual process by a sequential mechanism, which mimics matching procedures for many-to-one real-life matching problems. In this framework, we provide a family of mechanisms implementing the student-optimal matching in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE).<br/><br/>J. Alcalde, A. Romero-Medina (2005) <i>Economics Letters</i> 86: 2 153-158<br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid6 2009-07-19T13:43:04Z

This paper explores the existence of stable research teams, when the preferences of each agent depend on the set of researchers who are collaborating. We introduce a property over researchers’ preferences, called top responsiveness, guaranteeing the existence of stable research teams configurations. We also provide a stable mechanism, induced by the so-called top covering algorithm, which is str...<br/><br/>J. Alcalde, P. Revilla (2004) <i>Journal of Mathematical Economics</i> 40: 8 869-887<br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid7 2009-07-19T13:45:32Z

This paper proposes a cost-sharing rule for the specific case in which the agents’ demands are heterogeneous. We first examine, from a normative point of view, a cost-sharing rule introduced as the axial serial rule (AXS) by Sprumont. We introduce a property, that we call Cost-Based Equal Treatment (CBET), and we demonstrate that the unique rule verifying the Serial Principle (SP) and this prope...<br/><br/>J. Alcalde, J.A. Silva (2004) <i>Journal of Mathematical Economics</i> 40: 7 831-845<br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid17 2010-11-15T09:10:37Z

This paper proposes an strategic analysis of mechanisms assigning workers to firms. We point out that the emply of these mechanisms guarantee the market' stability. We study two types of mechanisms. The first one is related to the case in which agents in a side of the market have an active role by searching a job, whereas the other side is mostly passive because its agents just receive offers. ...<br/><br/>J. Alcalde (2000) <i>Jóvenes Economistas en Andalucía</i> 12-27<br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid8 2009-07-19T13:49:48Z

This paper analyzes simple mechanisms implementing (subselections of) the core correspondence of matching markets. We provide a sequential mechanism which mimics a matching procedure for many-to-one real life matching markets. We show that only core allocations should be attained when agents act strategically when faced with this mechanism. We also provide a second mechanism to implement the core ...<br/><br/>J. Alcalde, A. Romero-Medina (2000) <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> 31: 2 294-302<br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid10 2009-07-19T14:01:52Z

This paper studies simple hiring procedures for job markets. We show that when agents act strategically only individually rational outcomes should be expected. Moreover, if agents can form unions, thereby gaining the possibility to commit on the decisions to be chosen, only stable allocations are implemented.<br/><br/>J. Alcalde, P. Revilla (1999) <i>Economics Letters</i> 62: 2 189-195<br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid9 2009-07-19T13:53:48Z

This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economies with externalities. We provide two simple mechanisms implementing the Pigouvian Social Choice Correspondence in environments in which coalitions can or cannot be formed.<br/><br/>J. Alcalde, L.C. Corchón, B. Moreno (1999) <i>Journal of Public Economic Theory</i> 1: 2 271-281<br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid11 2009-07-19T14:06:34Z

We implement the stable correspondence of a job matching market in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. We use a simple sequential mechanism in which firms propose a salary to each worker (first stage) and, then, each worker accepts at most one proposal (second stage). Moreover, if agents' preferences are additive, this mechanism implements in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium the firms' optimal corre- spondenc...<br/><br/>J. Alcalde, D. Pérez-Castrillo, A. Romero-Medina (1998) <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> 82: 2 469-480<br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid12 2010-11-15T09:02:25Z

This paper proposes a new axiomatic justification for the employ of the Aumann-Shapley value for non-atomic games in the context of cost sharing.<br/><br/>J. Alcalde (1996) <i>Economía Mexicana</i> V: 1 77-97<br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid13 2009-07-19T14:13:11Z

This paper analyzes the possibility of implementing stable outcomes for marriage markets. Our first result shows a contradiction between the use of stable mechanisms and the hypothesis of agents' behavior considered in the Nash equilibrium concept. We analyze the possibility of implementing two sets of stable allocations, by employing two types of mechanisms. The first mechanism is a "now-or-never...<br/><br/>J. Alcalde (1996) <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> 69: 1 240-254<br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid14 2009-07-19T14:16:00Z

Two stability concepts for one-sided matching markets are analyzed: Gale-Shapley stability and ξ-stability. The first one applies best to markets where no status quo allocation is considered, whereas the second one is a solution to be used when property rights are allowed. A common problem of existence is shared by both solution concepts. Hence, we study economic environments where this problem d...<br/><br/>J. Alcalde (1995) <i>Economic Design</i> 1: 1 275-287<br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid15 2009-07-19T14:19:04Z

This paper explores the possibility of designing strategy-proof mechanisms yielding satisfactory solutions to the marriage and to the college admissions problem. Our first result is negative. We prove that no strategy-proof mechanism can always choose marriages that are individually rational and Pareto efficient. This strengthens a result by Roth (1982) showing that strategy-proof mechanisms canno...<br/><br/>J. Alcalde, S. Barberà (1994) <i>Economic Theory</i> 4: 3 417-435<br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid18 2009-07-19T14:30:21Z

This paper studies, from a theoretical point of view, the assignament of workers to different departments within a firm: our first contribution to this analysis pertains to a non-traditional modelling of workers' preferences, as they can rank different tasks and can even reject some potential jobs. In this context we characterice a set of conditions that insure the existence of stable allocations,...<br/><br/>J. Alcalde (1992) <i>Cuadernos Económicos de I.C.E.</i> 52: 79-95<br/>

http://publicationslist.org/jose.alcalde/refid19 2010-11-15T09:04:00Z

J. Alcalde, A. Chaves, A. Díaz (1990) <i>Hacienda Pública Española</i> 116: 3 7-35<br/>