2007- Deputy Director at IES, Charles University Prague 2007- Editor of the AUCO Czech Economic Review 2006- Assistant Professor, CEZ Corporate Chair in Economics at IES, Charles University Prague 2004-06 PhD in Economics, Charles University Prague 2004-07 Lecturer at Prague Business School 1997-03 MSc in Economics 1995-03 MA in Political Science
Abstract: This paper examines the equilibrium provision of a public good if the private monetary contributions of identical agents are (im)pure complements. To reconcile complementarity in contributions with the apparent substitutability of monetary payments, we assume a setup with multiple inputs into a complementary production function. This paper proves the uniqueness and symmetry of the equilibrium for any impure complementarity if each agent is permitted to contribute
to any input; in the equilibrium, contributions are strategic substitutes. Only pure complementarity exhibits multiple equilibria, where contributions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements.
Abstract: We survey the state-of-the-art methods of how to rank economic departments and economists on the basis of 14 studies conducted in years 1995-2005. We cover a diversity of rankings: U.S., worldwide, E.U., those of developed academic nations and those of developing academic nations. Each method rests on a specific goal: while some identify top-notch research, others reflect quantity and thus are able to discriminate down the ranking. We also document novelties in ranking-construction such as sensitivity analysis, parallel rankings, instant updates and journal weights based on impact-adjusted impact factors.
Abstract: This paper discusses the methodology of quantitative measures of research output. The authors illustrate various approaches to the contentious issue of to how to treat co-authored papers, how to best affiliate migrating authors, and how to quantify the quality of economic periodicals. The authors also summarize the main findings from the three papers published in this issue, which are devoted to the quantification of publishing activity of Czech and Slovak economists, and which reveal a high concentration of research activity in only a few institutions in the Czech and Slovak republics and the rather convoluted standards of promotion in Czech universities.
Abstract: We survey theories of impacts of budgetary rules in the budget process, review empirical evidence and on the basis of comparative studies design an optimal shape of the Czech budgetary rules. The theoretical section focuses on conventional and non-intuitive effects of spending caps under alternative electoral systems. Empirical sections conveys a meta-analysis of five studies on fiscal governance in Central and Eastern European countries. The final part recommends changes in the budget process of the Czech Republic.
Abstract: If local public goods exhibit spillovers and regions are sufficiently symmetric, decentralization implies underprovision, whereas cooperative centralization is associated with a strict Pareto-improvement. This classic inference rests on two assumptions: local politicians are delegated sincerely and never provide voluntary transfers to the other regions. We abandon these assumptions in a setup of two symmetric regions with imperfect complementarity between local public goods. For this particular aggregation, non-cooperative decentralization can achieve the social optimum, whereas cooperative centralization cannot.
Notes: currently submitted to Oxford Economic Papers
Abstract: In the fields of social choice, public choice and political economics, the main difference between private and political choice is whether individual preferences are aggregated to make a decision. A much less studied difference is whether beliefs are aggregated to make a decision. In this paper, we argue that the need for aggregation creates different incentives for belief updates in private and political choice. We review contemporary theories of biased beliefs in politics: Bayesian misperceptions, behavioral anomalies, and rational irrationality. We examine assumptions and consequences of all the approaches vis-Ã -vis issues of common knowledge, stability, symmetry, and multiplicity of stable states. As a route for further analysis, we construct an evolutionary model including a coordination failure. Differences in learning dynamics make the political play of this baseline game Pareto-inferior to the private play.
Abstract: When local public goods are provided by a centralized authority, spillovers may be coordinated, but heterogeneity in preferences may be suppressed. Besley and Coate (2003) have already solved this classic trade-off for a uniform tax regime. Here, we extend their approach by allowing for a non-uniform tax regime. We find that centralization with our tax system necessarily increases welfare in comparison to uniform-tax centralization. Importantly, with non-cooperative legislators coming from homogenous districts, our centralization dominates decentralization for any degree of spillovers. In other cases, it at least improves odds of centralization, if measured by utilitarian yardstick.
