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Rupert Read

r.read AT uea.ac.uk
r.read@uea.ac.uk
RUPERT READ works mainly on the therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein, therapeutic readings of film and literature, and ecological critiques of liberalism. He is Reader in Philosophy at the University of East Anglia.
For a full cv, goto:
http://rupertread.fastmail.co.uk/Academic%20CV.doc
[Please note that this site, publicationslist.org , carries by no means a full listing of my publications. It is a listing of what I consider to be my main philosophical publications, and so will probably be sufficient for the purposes of most visitors. My cv has a much fuller listing, including Critical Notices and Review essays, etc. For up to date work (work in press, forthcoming, etc.), please go to my academia site.]
For other aspects of my work and life, please goto www.rupertread.net

Books

2008
2007
2005
2002
2000

Journal articles

Draft - under review
2011
Rupert Read (2011)  A strengthened ethical version of Moore's paradox?   Philosophical Psychology  
Abstract:
Notes: This is at present only a draft, under review.
2010
2009
Rupert Read (2009)  The case of John Rawls vs. The refuseniks   Practical Philosophy  
Abstract: I examine one powerful real-life case-study of the impact John Rawlsâs philosophy has had upon the law and politics. The case-study is the (outside Israel) surprisingly little-known significant impact of Rawlsâs doctrine on the conscientious objection vs. civil disobedience issue in relation to the âCourage to Refuseâ movement in Israel/Palestine. I argue that Rawlsâs arguments have had an influence on preventing the âRefuseniks'' movement from getting a fair hearing. For those of us who believe (as virtually every country in the U.N. believes, for instance) that Israelâs occupation of Palestine is a violation of international law, this is distressing -- and revealing. Rawlsâs doctrine of a sharp line between conscientious objection and civil disobedience, a doctrine thoroughly grounded in the liberal private vs. public distinction -- and preserving the âsanctityâ of the political sphere so as not to have it invaded by âcomprehensiveâ doctrines -- has biassed the pitch against the very idea of a conscientious objection that is civil disobedience. Rawlsâs -- contemporary political liberalismâs -- system of thought leaves no conceptual space for same; with the consequence that space has to be found in Israeli prisons for some of Israelâs most conscientious citizens.
Notes:
2008
Rupert Read (2008)  The hard problem of consciousness is continually reproduced and made harder by all attempts to solve it   Theory, Culture and Society 25: 2. 51-86 March  
Abstract: I argue that the so-called âhardâ problem of consciousness â the problem of how consciousness is possible at all, and how it âconnectsâ with matter â is only an artefact of the ways in which human scientists approach consciousness and (more generally) mind. Putting the point paradoxically but also quite precisely: the efforts to solve the mind-body problem, and this its latest variant form, are the very disease of which they take themselves to be the cure. I give examples drawn from sociology and from philosophy to support this claim, and then try to mitigate this vicious consequence of cognitivism in both disciplines by offering a Wittgensteinian dissolution of the [pseudo-]problem as an alternative to [hopeless] cognitivist efforts to solve it.
Notes:
2007
2006
Phil Hutchinson, Rupert Read (2006)  An ELUCIDATORY interpretation of the _TRACTATUS_   IJPS 14: 1. 1-29  
Abstract:
Notes: Dan Hutto replied in the same issue.
2004
2003
Rupert Read (2003)  Against 'time-slices'   Philosophical Investigations 26: 1. 24-43  
Abstract: The concept of âtime-sliceâ turns out to be at best philosophically inconsequential, I argue. Influential philosophies of time as apparently diverse as those of Dummett, Lewis and Bergson, thus must come to grief. The very idea of âtime-sliceâ upon which they rest -- the very idea of spatialising time, and of rendering the resulting âslicesâ of potentially infinitely small measure -- turns out on closer acquaintance not to amount to anything consequential that has yet been made sense of. Time is, rather, a ubiquitous lived âtoolâ for the organisation and co-ordination of human activities, a tool so completely involved in those activities that Anti-Realism about it is as unstateable as Realism about it is unnecessary.
Notes:
Rupert Read (2003)  Time to stop trying to provide an account of time   Philosophy 78: 397-408  
Abstract:
Notes: Prof. Sir Michael Dummett replied to this paper, in the same issue. You can read the upshot of the whole thing in my book, APPLYING WITTGENSTEIN.
Rupert Read, Rob Deans (2003)  "Nothing is shown"   Philosophical Investigations 26: 3. 239-268  
Abstract: We argue: (1) That Mounceâs critique of âthe New Wittgensteinâ interpretation as a form of positivism begs the question, by ignoring the possibility that any reading of Wittgenstein that is not âmysticalâ must be positivistic; and that Mounce moreover relies -- in his defence of a âmysticâ or âineffabilisticâ reading of Wittgenstein -- on an interpretation of the saying vs. showing distinction which is incoherent and plainly not Wittgensteinâs own. (2) That the roots of some key misunderstandings of âresolutismâ may be traced to a failure to distinguish between different versions of the project initiated by Conant and Diamond, and to an unwise assumption by critics of Diamond that her work taken alone, and her work indeed of the 1980s, is already âresolutismâ, rather than only a prolegomena, a project. (3) That essays critical of Diamond by Emiliani, Koethe and Vilhauer, err, when they err, largely for just these reasons; and that, when a âstrongâ (or âJacobinâ) version of resolutism is considered, instead of Diamondâs older writings, then one can justifiably say either that the âNew Wittgensteinâ project is the true friend of the saying vs. showing distinction, or that nothing is shown, and that the very idea any ineffabilism is overcome, thus leaving one free to plot the deep continuities between Wittgensteinâs early and later thought which are real.
Notes:
Rupert Read (2003)  Literature as philosophy of psychopathology   PPP 10: 2. 115-124  
Abstract:
Notes: Prof. Louis Sass and Nobel Laureate J.M. Coetzee replied to this paper, in the same issue.
2002
Rupert Read (2002)  Is 'What is time?' a good question to ask?   Philosophy 77: 193-209  
Abstract:
Notes: Michael Dummett replied to this article at length, the following year. For an improved version of this material, please read my APPLYING WITTGENSTEIN, Part 3.
2001
Rupert Read (2001)  What does 'signify' signify?   Philosophical Psychology 14: 4. 499-514  
Abstract:
Notes: Grant Gillett replied, in the same issue
Rupert Read (2001)  On wanting to say "All we need is a paradigm"   The Harvard Review of Philosophy XI: 88-105 Spring  
Abstract:
Notes: This piece was reprinted in a volume containing the best of the Harvard Review, a volume which took its title from the title of my essay.
2000
Rupert Read, Emma Willmer (2000)  Psychotherapy: a form of prostitution?   British Gestalt Journal 9: 2. 30-36 Dec.  
Abstract:
Notes: A reply was published in the next issue of the journal.
1999
James Guetti, Rupert Read (1999)  Meaningful Consequences   Philosophical Forum XXX: 4. 289-314 Dec.  
Abstract:
Notes: An improved version of this material was published in Part 1 of my APPLYING WITTGENSTEIN.
1996
1995

Book chapters

Forthcoming
Rupert Read (Forthcoming)  Ordinary and everyday language   In: Wittgenstein: Key Concepts  
Abstract: What âordinary/everyday languageâ is taken to be opposed to is whatâs critical. The key point of this article is to suggest, contra what still tends to be the prevailing wisdom, that the crucial mistake in Wittgenstein studies has been to massively misidentify the contrast class that Wittgenstein intended. The key such contrast-class is: âmetaphysicalâ (not, e.g. âscientificâ.). It is a complete misunderstanding to suppose that what Wittgenstein does is to identify positively an actual class of sentences or utterances, and characterise them as manifesting âthe everydayâ or âthe ordinaryâ as an allegedly positive category. Rather, Wittgenstein identifies âthe metaphysicalâ as a (delusive, though deep) aspiration â and counterposes ordinary or everyday language to that. (To that nonsense, that nothing.)
Notes:
Phil Hutchinson, Rupert Read (Forthcoming)  Therapy   In: Wittgenstein: Key Concepts Edited by:Kelley Dean Jolley.  
Abstract: The key connection between therapy as Wittgenstein practices it and the psychotherapy from where he got the idea is in the authority being vested in the therapee, not the therapist. Thus Wittgensteinian philosophy gives up the standard claim of the philosopher to know, to know what others donât. Rather, philosophy becomes about helping others to heal â and healing oneself. By means of learning how to explore and to overcome oneâs own desires to mire oneself in nonsense.
Notes:
2009
2005
Rupert Read (2005)  The first shall be last...: the importance of On Certainty 501   In: Essays on On Certainty Edited by:Daniele Moyal-Sharrock. Palgrave  
Abstract: OC 501 seems a pretty plain indication of the continuity of Wittgensteinâs philosophy. But is it perhaps an indication that OC is continuous with TLP (construed after the âineffabilistâ interpretation of Anscombe, Hacker, etc.) and not with PI? I suggest rather that in his last writings Wittgenstein comes to recognise more explicitly the continuities between TLP and PI etc. and OC. I do this by experimenting with two apparently opposed readings of OC 501, and attempting to place them both in the context of (i.e. in contrast to) the relatively new âresoluteâ and âtherapeuticâ reading of Wittgensteinâs philosophizing championed by Conant, Diamond, Floyd and Goldfarb. In short, I aim to show that OC 501, read in context, simply shows that, at the last, Wittgenstein was endeavouring to philosophize in a resolute fashion, as he had more or less throughout -- and very largely succeeding.
Notes:
2004
Rupert Read (2004)  Wittgenstein and Faulkner's Benjy   In: The literary Wittgenstein Edited by:Gibson and Huemer. Routledge  
Abstract:
Notes: An improved version is to be found in Part 2 of my APPLYING WITTGENSTEIN.
2002

Conference papers

1990
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