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Suresh Deman 

Dr. Suresh Deman
B.Sc. MA (India), MA&ABD(US), M.Phil. (UK) & Ph.D. (Japan) 
Visiting Professor,
Honorary Director & Consultant
& Advisor, Barefoot Layers Training Institute
PO Box 17517
London SE9 2ZP, UK
s_deman2000@yahoo.co.uk
Academic Prifile of Dr. Suresh Deman

I am a specialist on Mergers and Acquisitions & Regulations, Corporate Governance, Financial Modelling and many other areas of Real Estate & Finance and Economics. My earlier work also involved Business Economics & Finance and Input Modelling for Impact Assessment. Most of my research has theoretical underpinning even in empirical work. I have had an opportunity work and lecture as a Chair/Professors/Readers at least in five other universities with a Ranking of 3A/4/5 in the 1996 Research Assessment Exercise [RAE] and have worked as a Post Graduate Research Coordinator & Subject Group and Unit Leader at one of the old Universities, New university and also overseas. In fact, Nottingham University one of the top Universities assessed my research at the level of RAE 4 for 2001-2006. I have considerable experience of consultancy in private, government and international organisations. I also have considerable variety of administrative experience in Higher Education involving ability to manage a team, contribute to e-tutoring and provide academic leadership.

I summarise my credentials as follows:

EDUCATION

I have an undergraduate degree in mathematics, two Masters degrees & ABD (from India & US) and was an M. Phil (UK) in Finance and Economics and a PhD (Japan). My major fields of interests are as follows: Real Estate Finance, Game theory, Microeconomics, Macroeconomics, Development Economics, Regional Urban Economics and Econometrics. I also have interest in the application of quantitative economics, econometrics and game theory to Economics, Finance and Accounting. My research work is entitled, "Studies in the Application of Game-theoretic Methods to Takeovers", a part of which is a reconsideration of some of the earlier work of Grossman and Hart (at Wharton School & Harvard) on Takeovers which is a mainstream topic of Applied Microeconomics (theory of the firm), Industrial Organisation and Corporate finance and has been published in the Advances in Econometrics and in the Special Issue of Managerial Decision Economics, 1994 and two other papers have been published in the Journal of Management and Governance 1999 and International Review of Financial Analysis, 2000. Besides I have two Chapters in the Proceedings of International Conferences published by Cambridge and Oxford respectively and I have just finished editing a book, Advances in The Theory of Hostile Takeovers: Game Theoretic Models and Econometric Estimation and other two books are under consideration. My recent work, "Corporate Spin-Off: Asymmetric Information", was accepted for in World Game Theory Congress 2000.

TEACHING

I have a wide range of teaching experience at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels covering variety of courses in Economics & Finance to diverse group of students at least in 7 countries. However, major experience of teaching and research has been in various fields of economics both, in semester and annual scheme of examination. My main specialism is in the application of quantitative, game theory and econometrics techniques to decision making economics, finance and accounting. This is reflected in core final year B.A./B.Sc. courses, Microeconomic, Macroeconomics, Industrial Economics, Corporate Finance, European Integration, Monetary Union, Regional Development, Quantitative Economics, Research Methods, and Advance Financial Statistics. These modules develop material taught on the second year economics, finance and quantitative modules, in order to introduce and critically appraise a wide variety of decision models available to economics, management and Regional Development. Modules are taken by 50-100 students annually. In addition, rather than provide tutorials for small groups, the students tackle specially designed problems in workshops of 25-30. My teaching returns would suggest that both the lectures and the workshop sessions are popular with students and shows commitment and enthusiasm for high quality teaching and learning.

During my stay at the Queen's University of Belfast and the University of Greenwich, I also taught some new courses: Real Estate & Finance, Financial Strategy, International Financial Management, International Finance and International Capital Markets which also contains are core courses for an accounting and financial management degree.
In addition to my undergraduate teaching, I also taught module open to all Masters students. The module entitled 'Corporate finance', Microeconomic, Macroeconomics, Industrial Economics, Real Estate Finance, Monetary Union & Emerging Markets, Convergence of Markets in the Monetary Union, Regional Development, International Trade & Development, Quantitative Economics, Research Methods, Advanced Research Methods, International Capital Markets', 'International Financial Markets' are based on Financial Management Research and provide a vital link with the 'Econometrics' and 'Finance Theory' modules, in that it not only enables students to undertake theoretical and empirical work in financial markets, it also enables students to critically evaluate published research and provide insights in this area.

As a consequence of my research and postgraduate teaching interests I have supervised several Masters, M. Phil and PhD dissertations in the area of finance and economics, Convergence of Capital Markets in Europe, Regional Development, Corporate Takeovers, Corporate Governance, Building Societies, Micro-Finance, Emerging Capital Markets and takeover activities in other sectors of the economy.

ADMINISTRATION

Initially my administration tasks were not too onerous, but in September 1992 I became coordinator for Faculty Seminars. In that capacity I had an opportunity to invite and interact with top ranking people in the profession from all over the world. In 1994 I attended Post-Graduate Research Supervision Workshop and became coordinator of Post-Graduate Research. As the coordinator I served on the Faculty Post-Graduate Committee and had an opportunity to evaluate applications and supervision of for PhDs/MPhil, developed curriculum in Finance, coordinated the development and delivery of taught modules at UG and PG levels, ensuring quality procedures in compliance with QAA, wrote guidelines for supervision and provided guidance to students, monitored students progress at all levels, engaged in examination process and coordinating with external and internal examiners, conducted and published research of a scholarly nature, etc. My international experience has also contributed to overseas promotional activities and I was involved in staff development and timetabling. I continue to engage in teaching and lecturing and an Honorary Director of Centre for Finance & Economics.

RESEARCH

To manage your account subscription or change your password, visit the account details page. Powered by publicationslist.org.I have considerable research experience in finance, economics and accounting. I have published a number of papers in refereed journals using interdisciplinary approach and had an opportunity to participate and present papers in several international meetings including International Conference on Performance Measurement-Theory and Practice and International Symposium on Energy and Environmental Regulation held at Judge Institute of Management, Cambridge and Hertford College, Oxford respectively and a UNEP Workshop on Environmental Economics in Singapore in which I contributed a paper to a volume on environmental accounting addressing corporate, social and affirmative action issues within local and global environment. My main research interests lay in the field of application of quantitative techniques, game theory and econometrics to economics, finance and accounting. In fact, I have published quite a few papers in the area of economics and finance (two of them are joint with Dr. Debasis Chaudhry and Dr Kaung Wei-Wen and other papers are single author), which are widely cited (see, Journal of Economic Literature & Social Sciences Citation Index, Web), which addresses issue of Regional Development, Real Estate & Urban Development and Emerging Capital Markets within Europe. I was invited to serve on the Expert Group of UNEP/UNCTAD in the US & Japan. During 1994 to present some of my consultancy work has developed into academic research, which I was able to publish in the referred journals. I was also invited to contribute four short articles on various aspects of finance, including 'Finance and Game theory' in the Encyclopaedia Dictionary of Finance, published by Blackwell, 1997. My research was rated at RAE 4 level by University of Nottingham in 2001. I have also obtained research funding from external sources. The above background has helped me in developing self?confidence, which enables me to accept new challenges and responsibilities.

PROFESSIONAL STANDING

In addition to the receipt of Young Social Scientist Award from the University Grants Commission for 1983-1988, my professional standing is evidenced in three further ways. Firstly, my services are being increasingly called upon as a referee for a number of leading academic finance and economics journals. I currently act as an ad hoc reviewer for eight journals. Secondly, I worked as a visiting professor in Australia, Poland, Japan, New Zealand, etc. Thirdly, I have played a key role in a series of Conferences sponsored by the European Financial Management, UNEP & UNCTAD and professional bodies and also served on the UNEP/UNCTAD Expert Group. I have presented plenary papers, acted as a referee for prospective papers and as an invited Chairperson and discussant for American Economic Association, International Conference in Accounting & Governance, Financial Management Association, Royal Economic Society, Econometrics Society Meetings, Regional Science Meetings, etc. The Financial Management Association International selected my papers as one of the best papers an awarded grant to present it. I also had an opportunity to present my paper in a very prestigious International Conference on Game-theory and Its Application held in honour of Professor Robert Aumann. I not only had an opportunity to meet with a number of Noble Laureates in economics but 3 Nobel Laureates also had attended my presentation in Israel. I had a rare honour of being taught and supervised by well known Professors in economics, finance and statistics, Professor C.R. Rao, Reuben Slesinger, Edward Green, Douglas Gale, Samuel Zamir, Asatoshi Maeshiro, John Doukas, Wayne Marr, Nick Wilson, etc. Recently, I was invited to present my paper in a special session of FMA held in Hawaii, which was chaired by Professor Michael Fishman.

The above background gives me great degree of confident. I have designed a new strategy linking teaching, research and personal development using a complementary approach. I am fully committed to equal opportunities and do not to tolerate less favourable treatment on the grounds of disability, age, racial origin, and religious persuasion and/or on the basis of gender.

If you need further information please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours Faithfully,



Suresh Deman,
Visiting Professor,
Honorary Director & Consultant
& Advisor, Barefoot Layers Training Institute

Books

Journal articles

2000
1999
1996
1994
1993
1991
1990
1988
1987
1986
1984
1979
1978
1975
1974

Book chapters

1998
1997
1996
1993

Conference papers

2011
2010

Other

1978

PhD theses

Dr Suresh Deman  A STUDY OF GAME THEORETIC METHODS AND APPLICATIONS TO TAKEOVERS   Fukuoka University, Japan  
Abstract: SUMMARY In Chapter I set out the importance of the subject matter and also set out the context. I propose to re-examine some of the earlier work of Grossman & Hart (1980a) on corporate takeovers. They strongly argued in favour of exclusionary devices as being socially desirable and necessary for successful takeovers arguing that it leads to a Pareto improvement outcome. There is a twin focus to this study of takeovers. The first is to identify important game-theoretic studies that involve the theoretical underpinnings and rationale behind the hostile takeover process. The second focus of this study is to apply a game theoretic theoretical model of the corporate takeover to other sectors of the economy in order to understand the process of takeover and mergers across two institutional systems namely: the US and the UK. In pursuit of these aims, this study will endeavour to marry both economic theory and application in that an application only makes good sense if it is grounded within a sound theoretical framework. In Chapter 2 I have critically reviewed the literature related to the ongoing debate on Grossman and Hart's theoretical work on takeovers from a game theoretic point of view. I have put the debate on these issues in a historical context and identified the recent developments in the subject matter. I have also discussed briefly the application of game theoretic techniques and takeover model to real estate and building societiesâ acquisitions and mergers. Chapter 3 includes an extension of my published work in which I have provided original insights and have addressed some of the main shortcomings of Grossman and Hart's work on takeovers. In Sections 3.5 and 3.6, I have discussed the policy implications to include considerations of the practicalities and the realities of takeover mechanism using some examples from the US experience. Following the Buckley Amendment most of the changes governing takeovers of corporations were also adopted in the UK. The motivation behind Chapter 4 is a footnote in Grossman & Hart (1980) paper on "Takeover Bids, the Free Riders' Problem and the Theory Corporations", published in the Bell Journal of Economics, 1980. Since the publication of G & H paper, a number of papers have been published in professional journals (including one in JPE which makes trivial contribution) identifying the shortcomings of their work. Broadly speaking, there are two classes of papers in the literature on corporate takeovers, see, Fishman (199) and Deman (1994). First categories of papers rely upon the continuum of player assumption, for example, Grossman & Hart (1980) and others. Second class of papers focus on finitely many players. For example, papers by Kovenock (1984), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Bagnoli and Lipman (1988), Hirshleifer and Titman (1990), Deman (1991, 1994), Holmstrom and Nelbuff (1992), Harrington and Prokop (1993), and Fluck (1993) have considered finitely many players in the game. The basic distinction between Grossman & Hart paper and the others is the assumption of a continuum of players and atomistic shareholders. Why should this matter? I will elaborate this briefly. With the continuum of players' assumption, the paradox is caused by the following "disappearance of information" because only the aggregate play is observed. Hence, the individual deviation cannot be met by rewards and punishments. In a finite number of players game, there is a change in the aggregate play whenever a player deviates. The change may be very small, but perfectly observable. Therefore deviations can be rewarded or punished regardless of number of players. Hence, the results are straight forward that takeovers will occur with positive probability in models with finitely many players. Since the publication of Schall's 1976 paper in the AER in related area, I have not come across any paper addressing problem of urban renewal using a corporate finance and/or game-theoretic model. In my paper I follow Milgrom and Roberts (1982) paper on Limit Pricing and Entry published in Econometrica, and use a subgame perfect approach under complete but imperfect information in the game. My thesis is an extension of Grossman & Hart work on takeovers and falls in the latter category of papers. I provide a formal mathematical structure to G & H model using measure theory and look at a class of games to include both, the continuum and finitely many homeowners to contrast the situation when the redevelopment project is indivisible and partially divisible. In the model I allow the developer to assemble a site for redevelopment within an admissible size range. As the expected values of the redevelopment and incumbent owners' free riding on the redevelopment vary continuously with project scale, G & H pure strategy symmetric equilibriums may no longer exist. In other words, the socially desirable symmetric equilibrium identified in the above model depends crucially on the assumptions of complete indivisibility of redevelopment projects and atomistic property owners. This will be the case if the project demands a zoning change, is of high commercial value, and the many incumbent owners are basically homogeneous. However, many urban renewal projects do not match these characteristics. Inner city residential redevelopment, for example, usually takes place in deteriorated existing neighbourhoods, and does not require a specific scale so long as it exceeds a threshold level. The relaxation of complete indivisibility also introduces variation to property owners' bargaining power, which cannot be handled by G & H model with uniform dilution. The richness of the model is further enhancement by the introduction of strategic interaction and rational expectations character into the model. Unlike G & H model I also show, one cannot completely rule out a possibility of the takeover by an inefficient developer, which may result in slum equilibriums. At the policy level my research intends to develop a corporate finance-game theoretic model that could describe a broad range of urban redevelopment projects, predicts the outcomes of real estate takeovers by developers, and evaluate the effectiveness and appropriateness of their using dilution (a privatised eminent domain in the context of urban renewal) in the process. In the absence of direct public intervention, urban redevelopment is in essence private investment in public goods. While Pareto improvement could be achieved by such undertaking, the "unexcludibility" of public goods tends to provide incumbent property owners incentives of free-riding on the improvements, and results in "holdout" problems that often hinder successful redevelopment. Certainly the government could step in whenever holdouts occur and exercise its power of an eminent domain to wipe them out, but it in so doing will invite scepticism about its impartiality. Leaving alone public intervention, could we solve the holdout problem by market mechanisms? To this date, no satisfactory answer has been offered in the urban or land economics literature. My paper, in fact, addresses some of these questions. The paper also provides an analytical framework for studying a broad range of privatised urban redevelopment by organising sales of real estate property at par with sales of stocks for a corporation. The main conclusion of the paper is that the threat of a takeover can facilitate a redevelopment programme undertaken by a developer even though the equilibriums are straight forward in a finitely many players' game for the reasons stated above. I also show that the developer faces a trade off between a low bid price and a high probability of a takeover. However, the probability of a takeover can be enhanced by the provision of dilution or exercise of right to an eminent domain. I therefore believe my paper makes a useful application of game theory and corporate finance to address policy issues of dilution, imminent domain, slum equilibriums, and other urban renewal problems. Paper also provides evidence in favour of how the market for development purchases should be organised. In fact, it seems like a potentially interesting idea and it might even be possible for a local government to adopt such a rule. To minimise abuse of right of an eminent domain by the government and to enhance the effectiveness of using an eminent domain as a threat by the developer I introduce a democratic (50% yes vote) or super majority rule in the model (to pass a constitutional test). In Chapter 5 I have included a historical development of the subject matter and the motivation behind mergers in the building society sector up to date. In this Chapter I have not only provided an analytical framework but I have also presented a formal model based on Chapters 3 and 4. Results are stated without repeating same formal results and mathematical process of Chapters 3 and 4. I have explained equations of the model in an endnote and the proof of the existence of equilibrium is presented in Appendix C using Mathematica, which is quite acceptable in the referred journals. I have done a thorough electronic search of literature and have incorporated only those, which are relevant to my research. Conclusions are set out in Chapter 6. To facilitate the readers I have provided glossary of terms of the language of takeovers and game theory is presented in the Appendix B.
Notes:

SSRN

Suresh Deman, Vrajaindra Uppadhaya  “Rolling Budget Rolled Over the People of India”   [SSRN]  
Abstract: Calyampudi Radhakrishna Rao (Rao for brevity, henceforth) celebrated his 90th birthday in September 2010. He received numerous honors including 1972 Fellow of Econometric Society, the 2002 US Medal of Science (the citation of which recognized his contributions to economics), and most recently the Royal Statistical Society announced its highest award of Guy Gold Medal for 2011 to Dr CR Rao for his fundamental contributions to statistics. He co-founded with Mahalanobis the Indian Econometric Society. It is generally believed that Haavelmo laid the probabilistic foundations for econometrics. It will be argued here that Rao (1943, 1947) laid alternate probabilistic foundation for linear structural economic relations with errors in variables, solving a problem suggested by Frisch. It will also be shown that this alternative is suitable for the newly emerging business analytic research for discovering patterns in economic data. This paper reviews Raoâs contributions to economic science including: (i) specification of linear structural economic relations with errors in variables, (ii) identification of the econometric model, (iii) efficient estimation of the econometric model, and (iv) testing of hypotheses about the economic structure. Our review of his work also indicates a rich potential for some of his contributions to advance the frontiers of economic science, as some of his contributions have not been fully exploited by economists.
Notes:
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